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Introduction12
Media, be it fiction (Suryajaya, 2015; Heriyati, 2015; Wirawan, 2015) or 
factual—documentaries (Paramaditha, 2013), journalistic reports (Parahita, 
2014), as well as videos conveying alternative perspectives of the 1965/66 
massacres—have been used to enhance social memories of 1965/66. Such 
media have been distributed through new media platforms, including YouTube 
(Espena, 2017; Ikhwan, Yulianto, Parahita, 2019). 
Owing to its capacity to offer different means of interpreting and 
remembering the trauma of modern Indonesian history, cinema has become part 
of the battle for history in Post-Soeharto Indonesia (Espena, 2017: 59). Arifin 
C. Noer’s film Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (The Eradication of the 
Treachery of the 30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party), more 
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commonly known as Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI, has been widely propagated 
to produce an official memory of 1965/66 and its aftermath (Zurbuchen, 2002; 
Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019). However, since the collapse of Soeharto’s 
New Order in 1998, at least forty alternative films dealing with the 1965/66 
massacre have been released.3 In the current digital era, the internet has been 
widely used to distribute films. As YouTube viewership in Indonesia is among 
the highest around the world (Katadata, 2018), the website has thus become 
one major locus of memory contestation (Ikhwan, Yulianto, Parahita, 2019). 
Within the context of the 1965/1966 Tragedy, both official and vernacular 
versions are available on YouTube.
However, not much research has explored YouTube videos related to the 
1965/66 tragedy within the context of the politics of memory. This study, 
therefore, asks how YouTube has interconnected with the politics of memory 
within the Indonesian state. How does YouTube reflect the politics of memory 
as a contested space and the dominance of certain social memories? Exploring 
Indonesia’s creation of social memories through YouTube is beneficial, as 
many countries have experienced similar traumas in the past and have used 
new media to contest such memories. 
Literature review
The Politics of Memory and New Media
The politics of memory refers to how political communities articulate, and 
hence gain recognition of, certain memories and narratives (Ashplant, Dawson 
& Roper, 2000: 12). It moves beyond the dichotomy of top-down and bottom-
up approaches, as it operates within the intermediate space between the public 
(the State) and the private (the individual), an arena or socio-political space 
within which social actors seek recognition of their memories and channel their 
agency (Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, 2000:12–17). The battle for memory is 
waged over the meaning and “ownership” of symbols, academic conferences, 
commemorations, reunions, and rituals, as well as through conventional and 
new media (Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, 2000; de Brito, González-Enríquez 
& Aguilar, 2001). 
The politics of memory produces different expressions of memory and 
positions within society. Bodnar recognises two types of memory expression: 
official and vernacular (Marschall, 2010). Official memory is promoted 
by cultural leaders and authorities at all levels of society, driven by social 
unity and the attainment of societal and political goals to foster particular 
interpretations of the past that reduce the power of competing interests 
(Marschall, 2010:141). In official memory, the state holds the institutional 
3. Jusuf (2016:12) notes that, between 2000 and 2011, 25 such films were released. 
More alternative films are found on YouTube (Ikhwan, Yulianto, Parahita, 2018). See 
Appendices, Table 1.
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power to influence how citizens remember and forget, often for nation 
building purposes (McGregor, 2016; Bijl, 2012; Sulistiyanto, 2007; Sturken, 
1997; Bargueño, 2012). Meanwhile, vernacular memory is abundant and 
diverse, propagated by ‘ordinary people’ interested in protecting particular 
values and memories of their direct experiences with past events or narratives. 
It is predominantly developed at the local level in small-scale communities 
(Marschall, 2010: 141), often being created and contested through cultural 
production and education (Huyssen, 2011).
Utilising technology, the state can create an official “prosthetic” memory4. 
Depending on the socio-economic power of the groups who produce and 
maintain memory, the state may transform official memory into monumental 
memory, something that is hegemonically produced and maintained through 
multiple possibilities, from “the word in stone” to the medium of film (Mitchell, 
2003: 443). Censorship can provide a means of buttressing the official 
memory, being used to dictate the link between society, the filmed event, and 
its filmic representation (Stora & Stevens, 2007). As history is incorporated 
into popular culture and information and communication technology, memory 
can be created through media which allows a moment of the past to exist in 
the present  (such as through biopics or documentary films) and flow freely 
between groups (Landsberg, 2008). 
YouTube has become a new site where people can record, share, exhibit, 
and retrieve memory, as well as mediatise artefacts over time and space 
(House & Churchill, 2008). Virtual memorials are able to augment the 
remembrance experience by cultivating fluid, interactive, and creative spaces 
that encourage high levels of participation, collaboration, and self-expression 
(Jones & Gibson, 2012). In the internet era, virtual memory has thus expanded 
beyond individual persons, spaces, institutions, and nation states, becoming a 
socio-technical phenomenon—one that is neither entirely social nor entirely 
technical (House & Churchill, 2008). Technological features work in tandem 
with larger cultural contexts. However, they are also subject to medium-specific 
constraints and thus contribute to the rapid obsolescence and disappearance of 
historical consciousness; they also tend to serve commercial and entertainment 
purposes, thereby nurturing a narcissistic amnesia (Haskins, 2007: 406). 
Monumentality, thus, can manifest in cyberspace and the information 
highway, thereby conquering both time and space but it might remain 
seamlessly connected with the existing traditional monuments (Huyssen, 2003: 
47). Similarly, virtual knowledge on YouTube can result from the colonisation 
of memory by the private sector and by the developed world; if a memory 
has no commercial value, no one will bother preserving it. Consequently, 
4. The term was coined by Alison Landsberg (2008), who defined it as memories that 
disseminate through mass culture and are acquired by people who have not a live 
experience of the events.
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vernacular knowledge and minority views—the records of small populations 
and information perceived as uninteresting and invaluable—are left out of 
digitisation processes (House & Churchill, 2008). 
The inequality of memory within the digital realm has been explored 
by Markotyrkh (2017:12), who found that YouTube has facilitated the 
remembrance of traumatic pasts by revealing Soviet, Russian, and Ukrainian 
interpretations of the Battle of Kiev, all of which are inclined to support unilateral 
perspectives and ignore alternative ones. Although alternative narratives are 
represented (unequally) on YouTube, Ukrainophone and Russophone users 
tend to utilise YouTube not to challenge national narratives of the past, but 
to disseminate and propagate these narratives online (Markotyrkh, 2017). 
By extension, alternative memories do not necessarily become monumental; 
official histories can be recreated in and dominate digital realms, receiving 
massive popularity due to the algorithms of economic power. 
Observing the use of YouTube as a medium, Knudsen & Stage (2012: 
432) found that the website enables “democratized memory practice where 
official justifications of war are disputed and scrutinized via all sorts of 
discursive and affective investments.” As such, although global spaces such 
as YouTube enable the circulation and reproduction of collective memories 
in de-territorialised and transnational modes, they may also contribute to the 
strengthening of national, and indeed, nationalist memories (Drinot, 2011). 
This is exacerbated by the disparate starting points of monumental and 
vernacular memories. A Telekom advertisement in Germany, for example, 
cannot create monumentality in cyberspace without a national monument; it 
thus enlists the Brandenburg Gate to signify something “made in Germany” 
(Huyssen, 2003: 48). 
The 1965/66 Killings in Indonesia and the State Politics of Memory
In the 1960s, the largest communist party in the world outside of the 
Soviet Union and China was the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI/Partai 
Komunis Indonesia), which was then the fourth largest political organisation 
in the country, after the National Party of Indonesia (PNI/Partai Nasional 
Indonesia), the Masjumi, and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (McVey, 1965). 
Nevertheless, the party was annihilated between 1965 and 1966, and its 
followers and sympathisers, including left-leaning intellectuals, artists, 
workers, teachers, soldiers, and ordinary peasants, all fell victims. In the New 
Order regime that emerged afterwards, the official history—based on a book 
by Nugroho Notosusanto—justified these killings by identifying PKI and its 
supporters as having masterminded the killing of six generals during a failed 
coup (Herlambang, 2014).
However, the claim is debatable; seeking an explanation for 30 September 
and its aftermath, scholars have put forth at least four alternative narratives 
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about the killings of the generals. In an article popularly known as the 
“Cornell Paper”, Anderson and McVey (2009, initially published in 1966, 
see Kammen [2017]) argued that G30S represented a culmination of internal 
army conflicts. This is also supported by Cribb (1990), who wrote that 
political tensions between the Army and the PKI had increased in the last 
years of Guided Democracy—especially after Sukarno’s health became an 
issue. Crouch (2007) identified three possible drivers of the coup: military 
officers dissatisfied with army leadership, the PKI, or dissident army officers 
in conjunction with PKI collaborators. The narrative that President Soekarno 
was involved in the coup was presented by Fic (2004) and Dake (2006). 
Other studies have identified Soeharto as the initiator of the killings, as no 
other actor benefited more than him and he did nothing to prevent the attack 
(despite having the ability to pass intelligence reports to generals Ahmad Yani 
and A. H. Nasution; see Latief, 1999). Still others have speculated that the 
United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had become involved as 
part of its ideological struggle with the Soviet Union and its allies (Scott, 
1985; Wardaya, 2006). Such counternarratives, though prohibited officially, 
circulated in Indonesian academic and intellectual circles throughout the New 
Order regime.
Adam (2018) identifies 1965/66 as having three phases—the prologue, the 
main event, and the epilogue—and argued that the epilogue (or impact) of 
G30S has continued into the present day. He describes the prologue as starting 
five years before 1965. In this, he departs from the New Order, which identified 
the prologue as having started with the Madiun Affair in 1948; Madiun was 
critical in this narrative, as it was used to argue that the PKI had betrayed the 
Indonesian Republic while it was fighting for independence. The main event 
was the killing of six generals on 1 October 1965, while the epilogue consisted 
of mass killings, discriminatory policies, and official histories of the main 
event. 
Despite Indonesia’s democratisation since 1998, the Soeharto regime’s 
official version of the 1965/66 mass killings remains monumental in 
Indonesia’s public memory (Budiawan, 2000, 2004; Adam, 2018). Even as 
new evidence from both survivors and perpetrators has enabled scholars to 
identify systematic patterns of violence across the Indonesian archipelago 
(Chandra, 2017; McGregor, Melvin & Pohlman, 2018; Hearman 2018), none 
of Indonesia’s post-New Order presidents have prioritised dealing with the 
past (Zurbuchen, 2002; Pohlman, 2016). 
Of the five presidents who have ruled Indonesia since Soeharto’s 
resignation—B. J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, 
Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Joko Widodo—only Abdurrahman Wahid 
(also known as Gus Dur) invited all Indonesians living abroad as political 
exiles to return, asked government ministers to take steps to restore the civil 
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rights of former detainees and exiles, apologised for the mass slaughter of 
communists, and encourage citizens to expose the 1965 massacres and other 
incidents of human rights abuses (Zurbuchen, 2002). However, when Wahid 
called for an investigation into those killings and proposed rescinding the 
Decision of the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly no. 25 of 1966 
(TAP MPRS 25/1966), which banned the PKI, he faced immediate opposition 
from anti-communist groups—including NU, Indonesia’s largest Islamic 
group and an organisation in which he had cultural roots. As Zurbuchen notes 
(2002: 573), “the public process of coming to terms with the legacies of 1965 
thus lost its earlier focus on recovering history and was readily subsumed 
within familiar polarizations: left vs. right, communism vs. Islam.”
Certain social memories become dominant as a result of the politics of 
memory, be it practiced by state or non-state actors. In Indonesia, although 
current president (Joko Widodo) initially vowed to settle past human rights 
cases—including the 1965/1966 tragedy—the government has maintained 
the New Order’s narrative through monuments, ideologies, and school 
textbooks, as well as requirements to watch certain films at school (Putten, 
2017; McGregor, 2016, McGregor, 2007; Zurbuchen, 2002). Even today, 
state histories identify the defeat of communism as the salvation of the nation, 
as well as the victory of religious values over dangerous foreign influences. 
Communists have been stigmatised as foreign, immoral, barbaric, and 
inherently dangerous (McGregor, 2016: 248).
At the same time, however, the politics of remembering has been exercised 
by state and non-state actors. Some civil organisations have challenged 
attempts to revise the official history, including judicial, military, police, and 
Islamist institutions—all of which participated in the killings (McGregor, 
2016; Fealy & McGregor, 2010). Moreover, civil society organisations have 
made efforts to promote truth and justice in post-Soeharto Indonesia, holding 
inclusive activities, using theological approaches, and sponsoring meetings 
mediated by young Islamist activists (Wahyuningroem, 2013). 
Nonetheless, these have faced significant resistance. For example, 
although the Indonesian government authorised a new history curriculum 
open to potential alternative discussions of 1965/1966, the Attorney General 
declared that books that did not use the acronym PKI (or G30S/PKI) to 
describe the Movement would be banned (McGregor, 2016). Similarly, since 
2014, anti-communist groups have protested book launches, film screenings, 
and meetings of former political prisoners in Indonesia (McGregor, 2016). 
Meanwhile, NU threatened to sue Tempo after the magazine issued a special 
edition that featured confessions from NU executioners (McGregor, 2016). 
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Method
This research employs a mixed methods approach to analyse alternative 
memories of 1965/66 that have or have not been uploaded to YouTube. First, 
between 1–14 August 2018, we entered the keywords G30S (30 September 
Movement), Peristiwa ‘65 (‘65 Event), and Komunisme (communism) in the 
YouTube search bar and listed the 39 suggested videos that had received more 
than 300,000 views. This list predominantly consisted of scenes or full copies 
of Treachery; we found only 10 videos that provided alternative views of the 
events, and these were among the least popular (Ikhwan, Yulianto, Parahita, 
2019). During the course of this analysis, we viewed more than 30 films with 
alternative narratives of 1965/66 (Appendices 1, Table 1), randomly selecting 
the titles from  a list of films screened at the Memory and Marginalised Voices 
Film Festival held by Kineforum on 24 October 2015 (Utami, 2015). To 
supplement these films, we consulted works identified in previous research 
(Ikhwan, Yulianto, Parahita, 2019), as well as those mentioned in interviews 
conducted for this specific study. 
On 11 November 2019, we entered the keywords film PKI into the YouTube 
search bar; again, the six most widely viewed videos were copies of Treachery 
(Appendices, Table 2). Other videos perpetuating the dominant narrative of 
1965 included scenes from Treachery as well as newly made videos presenting 
the voices of military museums and the descendants of the killed generals. To 
complement this analysis, we decided to analyse the top comments of the 
three most-viewed films on YouTube: Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S/
PKI (The Treachery of G30S/PKI), The Act of Killing (TAoK), and Kami 
Hanya Menjalankan Perintah, Jenderal! (We Only Follow Orders, General!, 
KHMPJ!).
A review of the literature was used to identify past incidents and policies 
related to the commercial and non-commercial films about the 1965/66. We 
interviewed eleven informants, mostly filmmakers but also activists, in Jakarta, 
Yogyakarta, and Bali5. Analysis was qualitative, as the topic is resolutely 
5. We interviewed I Gusti Ngurah Termana, the founder and coordinator of Taman 65 
Bali; Dr Baskara T. Wardaya, the head of the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights 
Studies at Sanata Dharma University; Ruth Indiah Rahayu, a columnist, historian, 
feminist, and human rights activist; Lexy Rambadetta, who produced Mass Grave; 
Ratrikala Bhre Aditya, the producer and director of C’est La Vie (an independent 
film screened at the Jogja-Netpac Asian Film Festival); Ari Yurino, program officer 
at ELSAM; Hanung Bramantyo, the director of Topeng Kekaksih (Lover’s Mask), 
Lentera Merah (Red Lantern), and Legenda Sundel Bolong (The Legend of Sundel 
Bolong); Dwitra J. Ariana, the director of Masean’s Message; Alexander Matius, the 
manager of the #50tahun 1965 Film Screening; Ilman Nafai, the director of Kami 
Hanya Menjalankan Perintah, Jenderal!; Janet Deneefe, the director of the Ubud 
Readers and Writers Festival; Faiza Marzuki, scriptwriter and drama director of The 
Silent Song of the Genjer Flowers; Bowo Leksono, the founder of Cinema Lovers 
Community of Purbalingga and the Purbalingga Film Festival; Dwidjo U. Maksum, 
the director of Air Mata di Ladang Tebu; Rommy Fibri, former commissioner of LSF 
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impressionistic and thus unable to be understood through quantitative means 
(Kracauer, 1953: 640).
Findings and Discussion
The first section discusses the socio-technical factors underlying the high 
viewership of Treachery, including the discourse strategies of alternative 
filmmakers and upload dates of political videos on YouTube. The politics of 
remembering, as practiced by alternative filmmakers and YouTube users, have 
interacted with Indonesia’s broader political and social tensions. Recognising 
that the state, filmmakers, civil society, and mass organisations have taken 
part in the memory politics of the country, the second section discusses how 
regulation, censorship, filmmaker agency, film festivals, and vigilante groups 
have shaped the memory of 1965/66 on YouTube. 
The Monumental ‘Treachery’ on YouTube
This study argues that the videos which appear on YouTube reflects the 
social and political situations in which the platform is operated and utilised. 
However, before further discussing the social and political contexts of observed 
YouTube videos, this section shows that the monumentality of Treachery on 
YouTube can be analysed from the fact that numerous versions have been 
and M. Nur Khoiron former commissioner of Human Rights Commission (Komnas 
HAM). 
 
Fig. 1. Kami Hanya Menjalankan Perintah, Jenderal! (KHMPJ!) contains testimonies from 
former members of Cakrabirawa, the presidential security forces of Sukarno.
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uploaded, and that these versions tend to be popular (Appendices, Table 2). 
The six most-viewed versions of Treachery on YouTube have been seen by 
thousands, receiving more likes than dislikes; likewise, they have received 
thousands of supportive comments.
The six most-viewed videos we found on YouTube are full copies of 
Treachery as released by its director, Arifin C. Noer. However, in many 
other videos (not listed in the Table), footage from Treachery is frequently 
re-uploaded or incorporated into new videos. Several have received 
millions of views. This can be seen, for example, in a talk show published 
by VisualTVLive entitled “Eksklusif! Kesaksian Anak Ahmad Yani atas 
Kejamnya G30S/PKI” (Exclusive! The Testimony of the Son of Ahmad Yani 
on the Cruelty of September 30 Movement/PKI” (uploaded on 29 September 
2017, 4 million views). Videos offering alternative voices have received much 
lower viewership, as seen by the examples of Mass Grave (2001) (uploaded 
by dphotografer, 7,900 views), The Look of Silence (2014) (uploaded by Jagal 
Senyap, 707,000 views), and Jembatan Bacem (2013) (uploaded by Belajar 
Mandiri, 161,000 views). 
On YouTube, the monumentality of memory might be influenced by identity 
forces, commercial culture, temporal social media trends, and unclear hyper-
textual narratives (Jones & Gibson, 2012; Horsti, 2017: 125; Huyssen:194). 
For example, being a spectator and creator of online video impacts on one’s 
national identity formation. The frequent uploads and remixes of Treachery 
show the influence of YouTube’s identity forces and commercial culture, which 
pushes and invites users to reuse existing video. The film has become prosthetic 
memory. Scenes of dark shadows and eerie tune of the conspirators in contrast 
to the bright houses of the Soeharto’s and generals in The Treachery lead to 
remembering 1965/66 as simply evil and secretive PKI versus the military 
(Putten, 2017:114). Usep Kartawibawa, who uploaded a copy of Treachery 
in 2011, provided a complete description of the film’s cast and crew. He also 
wrote that, although the movie was no longer broadcast on television, it still 
deeply affected anyone who watched it because “…the setting feels intense, 
the music score is terrifying, and the director smartly directs the casts to show 
firmness, sadness, anger, and sadism.” 
Despite the vernacular memory of 1965/66 being found on YouTube, as 
observed in the most popular videos related to the tragedy, the monumental 
memory on YouTube is limited to the events surrounding the generals’ 
killings. The complications and aftermath are ignored. This finding might be 
related to the tendency of the military and human rights activists to focus 
on different parts of the events. “I often watched discussions of 1965/66 on 
television that involved members of the military and human rights activists. 
Their talks concentrated on two different things: the military’s focus was on 
the days of the generals’ killings, while the activists [focused on the events] 
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after October 11, after Berita Yudha wrote disinformation about the killings.”6
Based on comparison of these six uploads of Treachery and two alternative 
videos (Kami Hanya Menjalankan Perintah, Jenderal!, KHMPJ!; uploaded 
by TV Dokumenter; 1.6 million views; uploaded on 18 July 2017), and TAoK 
(uploaded by Jagal Senyap; 1.9 million views; uploaded on 17 December 
2013), it can be seen that the social memories on the September/October 
1965 and its aftermath are highly contested on YouTube. Treachery continues 
to attract high levels of viewership. Meanwhile, despite many alternative 
narratives being available, only a few have received millions of viewers. 
On uploads of Treachery, most comments voiced condolences to the 
killed generals, reminded readers of the importance of maintaining Pancasila 
(the state ideology), condemned PKI either for killing the six generals or for 
practicing atheism, or recalled the Madiun Affair of 1948, in which the PKI 
was said to have killed devout Muslims and religious leaders. Some comments 
advocated the killing of people descended from PKI followers, arguing that 
this was necessary to totally eradicate communism. 
Although it must be recognized that, owing to its production during the 
New Order, Treachery has had more time to dominate Indonesia’s social 
memory, two socio-technical factors have also enabled it to become popular 
on YouTube. First, Treachery, its remixes, and other videos promoting 
the official narrative often refer to PKI with sensational keywords such as 
“violence” (keganasan), “brutality” (kebiadaban), “cruelty” (kekejaman), or 
“terrifying” (mengerikan) in their titles; similarly, emotional terms such as 
“sad” (menyedihkan) are used to refer to the children of the killed generals. 
These films’ provocative titles and hashtags, as well as their use of official 
terms such as G30S/PKI, make them more readily found by YouTube users. 
Ironically, the use of such terms may also benefit alternative narratives; take, 
for example, a version of Jembatan Bacem uploaded by Belajar Mandiri under 
the title “Jembatan Bacem Film Dokumenter tentang Peristiwa 1965 [Awas 
Kiri] [Full Video] [Dokumenter]” (Bacem Bridge a Documentary about the 
1965 Incident [Beware the Left] [Full Video] [Documentary], 161,000 views, 
uploaded on 11 July 2014). Similarly, the use of the word jenderal (general) 
in KHMPJ! may fit into YouTube’s algorithms, as the word is often used in the 
title of videos showing the six generals’ exhumation; indeed, KHMPJ! even 
trended on YouTube when it was first uploaded by an anonymous user7.
Most videos promoting alternative narratives of 1965/66, however, employ 
metaphorical titles and non-sensational hashtags, focusing instead on the 
epilogue or the aftermath of the killings of the six generals (Ikhwan, Yulianto, 
Parahita, 2019). Only some of these titles refer explicitly to the camps that 
held political prisoners or other sites, such as Plantungan (Putu Oka Sukanta, 
6. Interview with Ruth Indiah Rahayu, 29 May 2018. 
7. Interview with Ilman Nafai, 12 November 2019. 
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Fadillah Vamp Saleh, 2011), Pulau Buru: Tanah Air Beta (Rahung Nasution, 
2016), Tjidurian 19 (Abduh Aziz, Lasja F. Susatyo, 2009), and Jembatan 
Bacem (Yayan Wiludiharto, 2013); of these, the first two could not be found 
on YouTube.
 
Fig. 2. Jembatan Bacem reports testimonies from the families of lost persons in Central Java during 1965/66. 
Bacem bridge in Solo, Central Java is believed to be a place where some PKI followers/symphatizers were 
shot to death. 
Shortly, because alternative filmmakers do not use binary or confrontational 
words in the titles or descriptions of their films, Treachery has retained its 
position as the monumental memory of the 1965/66 tragedy on YouTube. To 
find alternative narratives, users must have prior knowledge and information 
on the films or on the 1965/66 event itself. KHMPJ! and TAoK, for example, 
received widespread media coverage and were subject to controversy, granting 
them greater public recognizability.
Second, remembering requires momentum. The fact that most popular 
videos were uploaded in the months of September and October indicates that 
the uploaders realise that they will reach broader audiences if they upload 
videos on or about Pancasila Sanctity Day. They recognise that, as Pancasila 
Sanctity Day is held annually on 1 October to commemorate the killing of 
the generals, people are more likely to search for related videos on YouTube 
(McGregor, 2002). 
The six most-viewed versions of Treachery on YouTube were mostly 
uploaded in 2017, at a time when popular debate focused on whether it 
was necessary to continue screening the film to prevent the resurgence 
of communism in Indonesia. For example, General Gatot Nurmantyo of 
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the Indonesia National Army (TNI) recommended that local army offices 
conduct public screenings of the film, despite the Ministry of Education and 
Culture of Indonesia having previously prohibited compulsory screenings for 
students (KumparanNews, 2017). President Joko Widodo, who had often been 
denounced as communist by his political opponents—particularly Islamist 
hardliners—watched the film together with soldiers at Makorem, Bogor, in 
September 2017 (Rahmawaty, 2017). Two national networks, TVOne and 
SCTV, even broadcast the film in late September 2017; both got high ratings 
(Lubis, 2017; Irfani, 2019). 
Also common in 2017 was the use of terms such as “communism” and 
“PKI” to attack political opponents, most prevalently in Jakarta’s gubernatorial 
election and in national politics (Parahita, 2017; Jaya, 2017; SMRC, 2017). 
These attacks, as well as widespread rumours of a communist resurgence, 
further sharpened the political divide between supporters of President Joko 
Widodo and his 2014 opponent Prabowo Subianto (Aspinall & Mietzner, 
2019: 112). In this context, fear of communism and the momentum of the 1965 
tragedy could be exploited for commercial and political benefit (Laksono, 
2017; Bawaslu, 2014; KPI, 2019).
Conversely, none of the videos presenting alternative narratives of the 
1965/66 tragedy utilised the momentum of Pancasila Sanctity Day, as they 
were not uploaded between the end of September and early October. This may 
be related to the political stance of the survivors and human rights activists. 
For example, I Gusti Ngurah Termana—the founder of Taman 65 in Kesiman, 
Bali—stated that they avoid commemorations in September and October 
because these transitional dates belong to the army not survivors.8 Those 
films that have received relatively high viewership, namely TaOK (2012) and 
KHMPJ! (2016), may have done so because of media coverage. For example, 
TaOK had received two prizes at the 2013 Berlin International Film Festival 
and covered by the global media before it appeared in Indonesian media. 
Social Memories of 1965/66, the State and the Agency of Cinema 
Communities 
Although the state may have officially declared which history and memory 
8. Taman 65 is a grassroot forum established by some local Balinese to voice the 
repressed memories of participants and enable them to talk about their missing 
relatives and share the testimonials of family members. The forum often invites 
filmmakers, musicians, and English-language educators to create dialogue among 
members. Ngurah, the coordinator of Taman 65, says that survivors focus not on 30 
September or 1 October, but the end of 1965 and subsequent years. (Interview with I 
Gusti Ngurah Termana, on May 8, 2018). Similarly, Dr Baskara T. Wardaya, the head 
of the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies at Sanata Dharma University 
and a researcher focused on 1965/66 (as well as reconciliation efforts), suggests that 
activities countering mainstream discourses should be limited because survivors’ 
stories start in the weeks after the events (Focus Group Discussion, 11 April 2018).
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of 1965/66 is true, the experiences of survivors’ families are legion. As stated 
by I Gusti Ngurah Termana:
I found that no one understands this extreme pain… my tears, my laments, my 
stories… who cares? … I had thought that it was better buried here (pointing at his 
heart), but I finally realized that it was wrong… If I keep it, then it is my burden 
forever… not only for me, but also my whole family, my children.... Of course, 
my grandmother was deeply sad when we set up this memorial right in front of 
her rebuilt house. Digging up the past means burning her with sorrow. … Yes, this 
extended discrimination is really evil… but to the point we tell lies to ourselves? 
To our family members? My grandfather was killed by one of his own family 
members, my grand-uncle (with a flat voice). … We should start to be truthful 
now, to break the silence… be truthful about our own history, our family histories. 
I don’t care about the government’s history.9
The uploading and provision of alternative memories, despite the 
monumentality of Treachery, is similar to Termana’s efforts to create 
alternative memorialisation and remembrance in his home, to break his 
silence and communicate his pain. Although such acts may invite protests, 
this only strengthens the alternative voice. For example, although Indonesia’s 
Film Censorship Body (Lembaga Sensor Film) refused to allow TLoS to 
be screened at Indonesian festivals,10 its appearance on YouTube has given 
it another means to reach wider audience. Indeed, our observations showed 
that YouTube has offered filmmakers—no matter their motivations—a way 
to reach broader audiences than possible with film festivals. This was also 
mentioned by Lexy Rambadetta, the director of Mass Grave (2001), who said 
that he deliberately distributes his films related to 1965/66 through YouTube 
(using the account Jakartanicus) because the website is the most popular video-
sharing platform in Indonesia11. A similar idea was also mentioned by Faiza 
Marzuki, the director of a filmed theatrical performance titled Silent Song of 
the Genjer Flowers (2015).12 As she put it, “Having my theatrical performance 
uploaded to YouTube let it reach more remote audiences, though my drama 
was originally written (under the title ‘Nyanyi Sunyi Kembang-Kembang 
Genjer’) and performed for an on-location audience”. Her video depicts 
heartily conversations between Rakhma and her grandmother in a livingroom. 
Rahma is curious about the life of her grandmother who was actively involved 
in women’s movement in her youngest years and she found the truth in the 
conversations. Meanwhile, Dwidjo U. Maksum uploaded his film Air Mata di 
Ladang Tebu (Tears in the Sugarcane Field, 2019) to YouTube as he could not 
9. Interview with I Gusti Ngurah Termana on 6 May 2018. 
10. Interview with former commissioner of LSF 2015–2019 Rommy Fibri, on 1 
January 2019, and former commissioner of Komnas HAM, Muh. Nur Khoiron (who 
applied for the censorship), on 4 January 2019.
11. Interview with Lexy Rambadetta, 30 May 2018.
12. Interview with Faiza Marzuki, 14 November 2019. 
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access commercial theatres.13 This drama movie taps the story of a man who 
returns from exile and how he is accepted by his ex-fiancée and neighbours.
In this context, it should be noted that—unlike the monumental Treachery, 
which is merely uploaded to YouTube or remixed in new uploads—vernacular 
memories are created from new materials. To remediate vernacular social 
memories of 1965/66 on YouTube, film communities have exercised their 
agency despite relatively strict regulation and threats from local vigilantes. 
The state, through the Film Censorship Body (LSF/Lembaga Sensor Film) 
and Article 18, Paragraph 3b of Government Regulation No. 7/1994, clearly 
prohibits content that promotes communism and/or Marxism/Leninism. 
However, such censorship only applies to films that are screened theatrically 
or televised, rather than those screened privately or to limited audiences. 
 
Fig. 3. Izinkan Saya Menikahinya (Let Me Marry Her) won the best fiction at FFP 2016. The relationship 
between two lovers must end since the woman is suspected to have familial relations with former members/
followers of PKI while the man is a member of the army. 
As of writing, YouTube content or channels have never been intentionally 
blocked by the Indonesian government—despite the authoritarian leanings of 
Law No.11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions. However, 
the Ministry of Communication and Information is permitted to block certain 
YouTube content or channels, as it has done with other online platforms 
(citing hate speech and pornography) (CNNIndonesia, 2019; Untari, 2019). In 
addition, the teaching of history at schools has not changed much, even though 
Indonesian millennials have a great desire to learn14. A study conducted by 
13. Interview with Dwidjo U. Maksum, 17 November 2019. 
14. Ruth Indiah Rahayu (a columnist, feminist, historian, and human rights activist) 
has rejected arguments that Indonesian millennials are ignorant and uninterested in 
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Tika Savitri shows that high schools students are more interested in learning 
about this tragedy from alternative media, in this case a filmed theatrical 
performance entitled MWATHIRIKA (Savitri 2018)—even though teachers 
(in Yogyakarta, for example) are reluctant to use alternative films as learning 
media (Pratiwi, 2016). As stated by I Gusti Ngurah Termana, “Our community 
struggles not only to disclose the dominant memory but mainly to reveal the 
ignorance about 1965/66 events. They even do not know what PKI actually 
was or the controversy surrounding it.”15
Before the massive influx of the internet and threats from local vigilantes, 
two routes were used to present alternative narratives and create vernacular 
frames. First, alternative narratives were presented through commercial films 
and theatrical releases during the early 2000s. According to Hanung Bramantyo, 
the director of Lentera Merah (Red Lantern, 2006) and Legenda Sundel 
Bolong (The Legend of Sundel Bolong, 2007) the earliest years of Indonesia’s 
political reform offered creative professionals the greatest freedom to circulate 
media (books, films) about the 1965/66 tragedy. Although Bramantyo’s films 
were motivated by personal aspiration, his agency was also supported by 
commercial producers’ willingness to support such films.16 “When filming Gie 
(2005), military troops—the Diponegoro Mobile Brigade—even protected 
the shooting sites, and lines of cameos hoisted the PKI flags,” he narrated.17 
Importantly, however, Gie (2005, directed by Riri Reza) did not represent the 
massacre itself. It was a biopic about Soe Hok Gie, a young political activist; 
and never explicitly explored the organised massacre (Lee, 2011: 327).18 
Meanwhile, although the song Genjer-Genjer—associated with the PKI—was 
allowed to appear in the film, a line including the title was cut by LSF. 
Second, non-commercial films (both documentaries and works of fiction) 
were exhibited in film festivals or in limited public screenings. In early 2000’s, 
Mass Grave (2001) was distributed in VCD format—despite high costs—and 
screened at many Indonesian campuses by students and cinema communities 
(with the notable exception of Udayana University, Bali)19. Mass Grave 
Indonesia’s modern history, feminism, or social movements. Citing her experiences 
with students, she argues that the problem is not millennials, but the methods used to 
teach history. Visual media may be more readily accepted by millennials, but textual 
literacy is prioritised. Despite Indonesia’s old-fashioned approach to teaching history, 
some students were asked to interview her about 1965/66. Among the questions asked 
is, Do you think the event of 1965/66 has ruined the nation of Indonesia?” (Interview 
with Ruth Indiah Rahayu, 29 May 2018). 
15. Interview with I Gusti Ngurah Termana, 6 May 2018. 
16. Interview with Hanung Bramantyo, 13 October 2019. 
17. Interview with Hanung Bramantyo, 13 October 2019. 
18. Gie received eleven Citra Awards at the 2005 Indonesian Film Festival. In this, it 
surpassed Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI, which had only received Best Screenplay at the 
1985 Indonesian Film Festival. 
19. Interview with Lexy Rambadetta, 30 May 2018. 
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(2001) was screened at Taman 65, Bali, even though the Balinese people were 
afraid of discussing the tragedy. Ngurah Termana recalled that, when Taman 
65 screened Mass Grave (2001) in the mid-2000s, audience members fled 
from the venue when they heard words such as “PKI” or the song “Genjer-
Genjer”.20
In recent years, however, screenings of films presenting alternative 
narratives have faced more threats and intimidation from local vigilantes. In 
2015, a planned screening of The Look of Silence, as well as related discussions 
at the Ubud Writers and Readers Festival (UWRF) faced objections and 
pressures from local authorities; it was ultimately cancelled21. Meanwhile, 
screenings of We Only Followed Orders, General! (Ilman Nafai, 2016) and 
Pulau Buru: Tanah Air Beta (Rahung Nasution, 2016) at the Purbalingga Film 
Festival were swarmed by people dressed in Islamic garb (Iswinarno, 2016). 
Screenings of TLoS at Gadjah Mada University, the Indonesian Institute of 
Art, and the Yogyakarta office of the Alliance of Independent Journalists were 
cancelled because of protests from mass organisations22. “If I were asked 
to make a film dealing with 1965/66 today, I would think twice, because 
people are now more willing to attack others who have different views,” said 
Hanung23. 
Despite this threat, filmmakers derived agency from their interactions 
with survivors as well as extant books and films. Commercial filmmakers 
such as Hanung Bramantyo had studied about the history communism in 
Indonesia long before the fall of Soeharto. Despite having been raised in a 
strongly Islamic family, Hanung Bramantyo had learned about this chapter 
of Indonesia’s history and incorporated his knowledge in his non-commercial 
film Topeng Kekasih (2001). He identified the 1965/66 tragedy, as well as the 
20. Interview with I Gusti Ngurah Termana, 8 May 2018.
21. According to Janet Deneefe, “We cancelled the panels because we were told that, 
if we continued to hold them, the Festival would not be granted a permit. Everyone 
in Indonesia knows that the authorities will suddenly close down events without the 
correct paperwork, if they choose. So we had to think of the bigger picture—we 
believed that, for all our paying guests, we had an obligation to guarantee the smooth 
running of the Festival and not a sudden cancellation. Our actions focused on the 
greater good. In the end, 1965 was discussed in so many panels, so the cancellation 
actually drew more attention to this issue. It became the most important subject for 
that year, and international press also wrote about it, after hearing about the UWRF’s 
dilemma.” (Interview with Janet Deneefe, 18 November 2019). 
22. On 17 December 2014, LPPM Sintesa, a study group at the Faculty of Social 
and Political Sciences, Gadjah Mada University, scheduled a screening of The Look 
of Silence. However, the organising committee faced intimidation from a local civil 
society organisation as well as police pressure (Asmaning, 2014). Similar persecution 
was experienced by the Yogyakarta Institute of Art and the Yogyakarta Chapter of the 
Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI, Asosiasi Jurnalis Independen) (Detiknews, 
2014). 
23. Interview with Hanung Bramantyo, 13 October 2019. 
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deadly riots that precipitated Soeharto’s resignation in 1998, as some horrific 
cases of violence in Indonesian history; he thus used horror to convey the 
terror of these incidents.24 
Non-commercial filmmakers, meanwhile, have generally been motivated 
by direct interactions with survivors or human rights activists, and supported 
by cinema communities. Lexy Rambadetta, the director of Mass Grave 
(2001), has concentrated on social justice issues—especially the 1965/66 
tragedy—since the fall of Soeharto; he learned of the opportunity to record the 
exhumation of PKI followers’ bodies in Kebumen, Central Java, after meeting 
some former members of Gerwani (a women’s organisation associated with 
PKI). According to Lexy, the issue of 1965/66 remained sensitive in the early 
2000s. However, many survivors began asserting their identities. Lexy met 
Sulami, Sulastri, Sumarni, and Putmainah—all survivors of 1965/66—as well 
as several former Gerwani members. Through conversations with them as 
well as some feminists, he learned to criticise the singular truth of 1965/66 
(and patriarchal culture in general) and that Gerwani had never performed 
the ‘Dance of Fragrant Flowers’ (Tarian Harum Bunga). Learning of an 
exhumation from Sulami, he travelled to Kaliwiro Village, in Wonosobo, 
Central Java, to record the process.25
According to Lexy, this exhumation was sponsored by Danielle Gouze, the 
wife of former French President Francois Mitterrand.26 Meanwhile, Jembatan 
Bacem (2013, Yayan Wiludiharta) and Masean’s Message (2016, Dwitra J. 
Ariana)—both alternative narratives—were supported by the Institute for 
Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM). Jembatan Bacem (literally, Bacem 
Bridge) documented a rare pilgrimage of victims’ families to Bacem Bridge 
in Solo, Central Java, where more than 70 people were executed; their bodies 
were subsequently dumped in the river.27 Meanwhile, Masean’s Message 
received Rp 35 million in funding from ELSAM. 28
Film festivals have become the main venues for alternative 1965/66 social 
memories to reach, attract, and engage audiences, as festival managers and 
audiences recognise the importance of these films. Alexander Matius, the 
coordinator of the Memory and the Marginalized Voices Film Festival (which 
was fully supported by the Jakarta Arts Council) says that the event was 
organised to denounce the state’s failure to recognise and apologise for past 
24. Hanung Bramantyo was also inspired by Cabinet Caligary, the first horror film in 
the world. He chose to integrate 1965/6 into the film’s narrative, arguing “Horror itself 
is about terror, not ghosts”. Interview with Hanung Bramantyo, 13 October 2019. 
25. Interview with Lexy Rambadetta, 30 May 2018.
26. Interview with Lexy Rambadetta, 30 May 2018.
27. Interview with Ari Yurino, ELSAM Programme Officer, 30 May 2018, as well as 
local people along the river banks.
28. Interview with Dwitra J. Ariana, 16 November 2019.
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violence.29 Film festivals conducted outside Jakarta have also offered significant 
mediums for young, local, and talented filmmakers to articulate and represent 
complex local issues, and even to promote trauma healing in Indonesia 
(Irawanto & Octastefani, 2019; Kurnia, 2018). Janet Deneefe, the above-
mentioned director of the Ubud Writers and Readers Festival, acknowledged 
that festivals have become one of Indonesia’s most important platforms for 
discussing global issues and ideas. “With its fifty-year anniversary, and as one 
of the most tragic events in recent times, it was important to commemorate ‘65 
during the Festival as part of the healing process.”30 
Similarly, Bowo Leksono, the founder of Cinema Lovers Community 
(CLC) and Film Festival Purbalingga (FFP), urged young participants to 
produce films based on their interests and concerns, up to and including the 
1965/66 tragedy. “Students are generally unfamiliar with 1965/66. Schools 
do not teach the subject fully. Therefore, before they produce their films, 
they conduct research. CLC supports their discussion and equipment,” said 
Bowo.31 The local government has subsidised the film festival, but not CLC’s 
filmmaking activities. As such, Ilman Nafai (born in 1999) used his own 
pocket money to cover the cost of producing his documentary KHMPJ!. In 
such a situation, the capacity to remember and remediate the past through 
cinema and other media depends significantly on the socio-economic power 
of the groups who produce and maintain them (Mitchell, 2003). 
In 2016, Ilman’s film, together with Raeza Raenaldy Sutrimo’s film 
Izinkan Saya Menikahinya (Let Me Marry Her), received the Indonesian Film 
Appreciation Award at FFP. Both films have been made available by CLC 
Purbalingga on its YouTube account32. Another film dealing with Indonesia in 
1965 and 1966, Firman Fajar Wiguna’s film Sum won Best Documentary at 
the 2018 Purbalingga Film Festival. It follows Suminah, a former member of 
the Indonesian Peasants Front (BTI/Barisan Tani Indonesia), a PKI-affiliated 
mass organization (Baqiroh, 2018).
Before writing the script for KHMPJ!, which conveyed testimonials from 
three former members of Batalyon I Cakrabirawa, Ilman read Kesaksian 
Soebandrio tentang G30S (Soebandrio’s Testimony on G30S) and other 
documents.33 “I wanted to create a movie that could be contrasted with the 
29. Interview with Alexander Matius, 15 November 2019. In late October 2015, 
Kineforum at the Jakarta Arts Council held a film festival titled “Memory and the 
Marginalized Voices” to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the 1965 incident 
(Utami, 2015).
30. Interview with Janet Deneefe, 12 October 2019.
31. Interview with Bowo Leksono, 17 November 2019. 
32. Izinkan Saya Menikahinya tells the story of a woman who cannot marry her fiancé, 
a member of the army, because during the pre-marital administrative process, he finds 
out that she has family members related to PKI. 
33. Interview with Ilman Nafai, 16 November 2019. 
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mainstream story about 1965/66,” explained Ilman.34 Through his filmmaking 
activities and his interactions with survivors, Ilman modified his previous 
prosthetic memory. He had once believed that PKI were sadistic atheists, but 
gained new perspectives that differed significantly from those taught in school 
and by Treachery.35 Cinematic attempts to enliven and propagate alternative 
memories of 1965/66 thus offer not a means of remembering a forgotten past, 
but acknowledging a past that has been covered up and slanted.36 
Conclusion 
Cinema has been a tool for keeping the 1965/66 tragedy spilling over 
into and being present in Indonesian public discourse, enabling the state-
sponsored version of the 1965/66 killings be reinforced. At the same time, 
however, YouTube has offered a platform for both sharing official memory 
and contesting it with alternative vernacular memories. This study has found 
that Treachery has become a monumental memory on YouTube, as evidenced 
by its viewership, its high number of likes, the positive tone of comments, its 
regular uploads, and its remixing into new videos. 
YouTube, despite popularly being perceived as a means of channelling and 
sharing the past, is actually recreating the monumentality of Treachery. For 
decades, this film has offered a prosthetic memory, becoming monumental 
not only through its official status but also through the activities of the 
communities who commemorate and enliven it. As shown by Landsberg 
(2008: 150), prosthetic memory has the unique ability to generate the empathy 
necessary to form political alliances and solidarity despite being indebted to 
commodification and mass culture. 
Treachery’s commodification and mass culture have resonated with 
YouTube. As such, the platform has not promoted vernacular memory, but 
rather brought past fears and propaganda into the present. As stated by van 
der Putten (2017: 2013), Treachery continues to instil new generations of 
Indonesians with “a sense of terror towards and ignorance of communism.” 
Conversely, even though vernacular social memories of 1965/66 are available 
on YouTube and provide tremendous alternative memories, one must have 
prior knowledge to connect with these alternative videos. 
The politics of the present play a much more significant role in shaping 
monumental memory than do political communities’ experiences of the 
past (Danforth & Boeschoten, 2012: 247). On YouTube, the politics of the 
present related to 1965/66 revolve around cinema communities, the political 
communities of memories, state regulations, and contemporary political 
34. Interview with Ilman Nafai, 16 November 2019. 
35. Interview with Ilman Nafai, 12 November 2019. 
36. Interview with I Gusti Ngurah Termana, 8 May 2018 and with Ruth Indiah Rahayu, 
29 May 2018. 
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tensions. At the same time, YouTube algorithms favour certain dates and 
keywords. These socio-technical factors have all contributed to monumentality 
and vernacularity. It might be true that for generation Z and younger millennials 
in Indonesia, watching 1965/66 on YouTube is not about contesting memories, 
but conquering fear towards and unknowingness of communism.  
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APPENDICES
Table 1. List of Alternative Movies Related to 1965 
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Table 2. Titles of Six Most-Viewed Copies of Treachery on YouTube 
(Search conducted 11 November 2019 with the keyword #filmpki)
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